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Abstract   
In October 2006, the Korean Fair Trade Commission (“KFTC”), the country’s antitrust 
and fair trade authority, began an investigation into illicit practices in the pharmaceutical industry. 
The  investigation  was  unprecedented  in  terms  of  the  number  of  companies  investigated  and 
found guilty (17 and counting), the scope of activities and volume of evidence reviewed, and the 
amount  of  fines  ultimately  imposed  (no  company  that  was  investigated  escaped  fines,  for  a 
cumulative total of approximately USD 35 million) for violations consisting mostly of illicit 
benefits provided by companies to healthcare professionals or medical institutions, which the 
KFTC found to be “unfair customer solicitation” prohibited under the country’s fair trade laws.   
In the aftermath of KFTC’s successful enforcement actions, other governmental agencies jumped 
on the anti-kickback bandwagon.    The framework of regulations which hitherto governed (or 
had  failed  to  govern)  kickbacks  and  other  illicit  benefits  provided  by  industry  to  healthcare 
professionals was overhauled.    The Korea Food and Drug Administration acquired powers to go 
after givers and takers of kickbacks related to the promotion of drugs, the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare could now unilaterally reduce, by up to 20%, the reimbursement price of any drug for 
which kickbacks or other illicit benefits were found to have been provided.    For the first time, 
police and prosecutors acquired express statutory grounds to investigate and prosecute doctors 
who received benefits intended to influence their drug prescription decisions.    Under increasing 
pressure  from  all  sides  to  root  out  corrupt  practices,  the  pharmaceutical  industry  trade 
associations undertook to overhaul their voluntary marketing guidelines, to show the world that 
they were serious about their efforts.    The new guidelines were very broad in the scope of 
activities  they  covered  and  draconian  in  the  monetary  ceilings  they  adopted  as  well  as  the 
procedural requirements they imposed on member companies who wish to undertake any of 
these activities.    As a result, these guidelines threaten to burden companies excessively without 
corresponding  benefits  in  increasing  transparency  and  eliminating  corrupt  practices,  with 
negative effects on the industry overall.                
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I.  Introduction   
For all its modern Western façade, South Korea (hereinafter, “Korea”) remains an Asian 
country in many ways.    Confucian traditions still continue to influence people’s behavior and 
actions and inform their decision-making.    Gift-giving is an integral part of the culture, and 
business is transacted on the basis of personal relationships.    Kickbacks from pharmaceutical 
companies to healthcare professionals, intended to influence prescription or purchase decisions 
for drugs, is a problem in almost every nation.    However, these characteristics may have made 
Korea  more  vulnerable  to  corrupt  practices  in  the  context  of  interactions  between  the 
pharmaceutical industry and healthcare professionals.    Structural factors play their part as well 
– generic prices are said to be set at higher levels than in many other nations, encouraging too 
many small, inefficient producers to enter the market for a piece of the action, and these players 
will certainly not be competing on the quality of their products, once they enter. 
There have been intermittent government efforts, going back many decades, to curb 
corruption in the industry, but these were sporadic and small-scale, so things always went back to 
normal.    That  is,  until  the  Korea  Fair  Trade  Commission  (“KFTC”)  launched  a  systematic 
investigation into industry practice in October 2006.    The scale and scope of this investigation 
has been unprecedented (the investigation has gone through a number of rounds and is still 
ongoing)  and  the  penalties  imposed  on  the  companies  found  to  have  violated  the  law  also 
unprecedented.      The  investigation  and  its  aftermath  ushered  in  a  new  era  for  the 
pharmaceutical  industry.    The  regulatory  framework  governing  kickbacks  and  illicit  benefits 
underwent a major overhaul, thanks to the efforts of other government agencies enthusiastically 
getting into the action.    The public by and large lauded these efforts to root out “black money” 
that  is  poisoning  the  country’s  healthcare  system  and  sapping  hard-earned  taxpayer  money 
funding  the  national  health  insurance.    “Compliance”  became  the  new  watchword  for  the 
industry.           
Responding  to  tremendous  pressure  from  all  sides,  the  pharmaceutical  industry 
associations brushed off guidelines they had long ago adopted but which its members had largely      
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forgotten, and with considerable cajoling from the KFTC, turned them into a very complicated 
and strict set of rules to be followed in any interaction with healthcare professionals or medical 
institutions involving economic benefits.    These new rules can be expected to have far-reaching 
consequences for the industry in the years to come, some unintended and many not so positive.     
This paper seeks to examine, in turn, the government enforcement activities and rule-
making  that  brought  about  the  dramatic  changes  in  the  compliance  environment  facing 
pharmaceutical companies in Korea, focusing first on the KFTC, which initiated the changes, 
and then the health ministry and other regulatory agencies, the industry’s response to the changes 
in  the  form  of  new  guidelines  for  interactions  with  healthcare  professionals  and  medical 
institutions, and some of the consequences to be expected from the new rules.    As we are still in 
the very early days of the new regulatory regime and the new industry rules, the examination of 
potential consequences will necessarily be limited.         
 
II.  Recent Enforcement Actions in the Korean Pharmaceutical Industry: KFTC 
A.  Overview   
In Korea, the KFTC is the government agency primarily responsible for enforcement of 
the country’s antitrust and fair trade laws – chief among them the Monopoly Regulation and Fair 
Trade  Law  (“FTL”).    Illicit  benefits  provided  by  pharmaceutical  companies  to  healthcare 
professionals for the purpose of influencing the latter’s drug prescription or purchase decisions is 
a near-universal issue, with which different countries have been grappling various measures and 
with varying degrees of success.    However, Korea seems to be a unique case in that this issue 
has been tackled on the widest scale and with the farthest-reaching consequences thus far by the 
country’s  fair  trade  authority.    The  KFTC  itself  has  recognized  this,  citing  its  enforcement 
actions  against  the  pharmaceutical  industry  as  one  of  the  30  most  significant  cases  it  has 
undertaken in its 30-year history.
1 
                                                                    
1  KFTC News, Korea Fair Trade Commission, 30 Biggest Cases in 30 Years (April 20, 2011, 13:24 PM), 
http://ftc.go.kr/news/policy/competeView.jsp?news_no=1035&news_div_cd=1; Tak-Soon Lee, Pharma Kickbacks 
Included in KFTC’s 30 Greatest Cases. Dailypharm (April 20, 2011, 12:00 PM),      
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In October 200, the KFTC launched a series of investigations into promotional activities 
in  the  pharmaceutical  industry  with  on-site  investigations  being  conducted  of  all  companies 
investigated.    The purpose of the investigation was to determine whether companies violated 
the FTL.
2    A key issue was whether certain practices in the pharmaceutical industry constituted 
the giving of excessive or improper benefits to customers intended to induce the customers to do 
business (e.g., listing on formularies, increasing prescription volumes, etc.) with the giver of 
those benefits (“unfair business solicitation”), in violation of Article 23.1(iii) of the FTL.   
The  KFTC  found  all  17  companies  investigated  in  the  first  and  second  rounds  in 
violation of the prohibition against unfair business solicitation, and some liable for other fair 
trade  violations  as  well.
3    The  KFTC  imposed  on  the  ten  companies  in  the  first  round  (all 
domestic  companies  save  one,  (“Ten  Companies”)
4  corrective  orders,  administrative  fines 
totaling KRW 19.97 billion (approximately US$ 17.78 million using current exchange rates) and 
filed criminal complaints against the top five companies in terms of revenues.   
Six  of  the  Ten  Companies  challenged  the  legality  of  the  KFTC  decisions  by  filing 
lawsuits with the appellate court,
5  contesting both the finding of violations and the basis on 
which  the  KFTC  computed  the  fines.    Two  different  divisions  within  the  appellate  court 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
http://www.dreamdrug.com/Users/News/NewsView.html?ID=140051&keyWord=%B0%F8%C1%A4%B0%C5%B
7%A1%C0%A7%BF%F8%C8%B8. 
2  The 17 companies investigated were Dong-A, Yuhan, Hanmi, Choongwae, Kukje, Green Cross, Hanall, Ilsung, 
Samil, Daewoong, Jeil, BMS Korea, Pfizer Pharmaceuticals Korea, GlaxoSmithline Korea, MSD Korea, Lilly Korea, 
and Otsuka Korea.    BMS Korea is the Korean subsidiary of Bristol-Myers Squibb and MSD, the Korean subsidiary 
of Merck.    Press Release, Korea Fair Trade Commission, Corrective Action Against Unfair Customer Solicitation 
and Resale Price Maintenance, Etc. by 10 Pharmaceutical Companies (Nov. 1, 2007), 
http://www.ftc.go.kr/news/ftc/reportView.jsp?report_data_no=2819.   
3  The first and second rounds were launched at the same time in October 2006, but the KFTC decided the cases for 
ten companies first in November 2007 (Dong-A, Yuhan, Hanmi, Choongwae, Kukje, Hanall, Ilsung, Samil, Green 
Cross, and BMS Korea) and for the other seven companies in January 2009 (Pfizer Pharmaceuticals Korea, 
GlaxoSmithline Korea, MSD Korea, Lilly Korea, Daewoong, Jeil, and Otsuka Korea). 
4  The types of practices that were found to be illegal in the first round included the giving of cash, gift certificates, 
and equipment to health professionals, providing entertainment such as through golf or the financing of overseas 
trips (sometimes with family), payments for post-marketing surveillance studies and clinical observational studies 
intended to induce prescriptions, and others.    Korea Fair Trade Commission, supra note 2. 
5  KFTC decisions may be appealed to the Seoul High Court, which is the appellate-level court, and thereafter, to the 
Supreme Court, the court of last instance.        
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reviewed  the  cases  and  were  split  in  their  decisions.    One  division  confirmed  the  KFTC’s 
decisions, while the other division essentially confirmed the KFTC’s findings as to violations 
having occurred but overturned the part of the KFTC’s decisions as to how broadly the violations 
were to be viewed as having occurred and how the fines were to be computed.
6    The Supreme 
Court in late 2010 remanded the case to the appellate court in those cases where the appellate 
court  had  overturned  the  KFTC’s  method  of  computing  the  fines,  in  a  development  widely 
interpreted  as  favorable  to  the  KFTC.    The  Supreme  Court  decision  is  examined  in  greater 
detail below.   
As for the criminal complaints filed against five of the Ten Companies, the Prosecutors’ 
Office  subsequently  issued  summary  indictments  against  all  five  companies,  which  two 
companies accepted.
7    The three companies that rejected the summary judgments lost in the 
subsequent criminal proceedings.
8   
With  respect  to  the  seven  companies  in  the  second  round  comprising  mostly 
multinational companies (“Seven Companies”), the KFTC found that they violated the FTL by 
engaging in unfair customer solicitation, resale price maintenance, and/or business interference 
and as a result, imposed corrective orders and administrative fines amounting to a total of KRW 
20.482 billion (about US$ 18.24 million at current exchange rates) on these companies.
9  None 
of the Seven Companies, however, was referred to the prosecutors for investigation into whether 
                                                                    
6  Myung-Ryong Kim, Dong-A Pharmaceutical Loses Appeal Against KFTC to. Overturn Fines. Money Today 
(November 7, 2008, 10:41 AM), 
http://www.mt.co.kr/view/mtview.php?type=1&no=2008110710394634283&outlink=1; Hee-Ra Yoo, Ilsung 
Follows Yuhan in Winning Partial Victory to Get Fine Overturned. Medical Today (November 20, 2008, 11:22 AM), 
http://www.mdtoday.co.kr/mdtoday/index.html?no=70620.   
7  Seok-Hee Hong, Dong-A Faces Criminal Fine of 150 Million Won, 5 Pharma Companies Summarily Indicted. 
Financial News (July 31, 2008, 16:04 PM), 
http://www.fnnews.com/view?ra=Sent1201m_View&corp=fnnews&arcid=00000921384609&cDateYear=2008&cD
ateMonth=07&cDateDay=31.   
8  Jung-Soo Seon, Criminal Fines Imposed on Pharma Companies for Giving Kickbacks. KookiNews (July 28, 2009, 
17:02 PM), http://news.kukinews.com/article/view.asp?page=1&gCode=soc&arcid=0921368125&cp=nv.   
9  The activities found in violation included (i) the provision of speaker/consultation/advisory service fees, (ii) 
product presentation meetings, (iii) sponsorship of attendance at domestic and overseas conferences, (iv) provision 
of supplies and services, (v) PMS studies and (vi) the provision of cash equivalents, where evidence was found that 
they were intended to induce prescriptions.    Korea Fair Trade Commission, supra note 2.      
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their actions constituted criminal violations of the FTL.    Some of the Seven Companies are 
understood to have appealed the KFTC decisions, which appeals are still pending before either 
the High Court or the Supreme Court. 
The  KFTC  launched  yet  another  round  of  investigations,  this  time  into  six 
pharmaceutical companies, in March-April of 2009, carrying out on-site investigations of all six 
and making follow-up requests for documents.
10  The results of this third round are still pending.     
 
B.  Legal Basis for KFTC Enforcement   
Article 23.1.3 of the FTL prohibits the unfair solicitation of competitors’ customers, i.e., 
the giving of improper or excessive economic benefits to induce purchases from the recipient.   
This  prohibition  is  elaborated  in  the  context  of  promotional  practices  in  the 
pharmaceutical  industry  in  the  voluntary  code  adopted  by  the  Korean  Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association (“KPMA”) and the voluntary code adopted by the Korea Research-
Based Pharmaceutical Industry Association (“KRPIA”).
11  Both were intended as bodies of self-
policing guidelines to ensure compliance with Article 23.1.3 of the FTL.    Both Codes were 
adopted  pursuant  to  Article  23.4  of  the  FTL,  which  provides  that  a  trade  association  may 
voluntarily  adopt  a  code  of  fair  competition  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  unfair  customer 
solicitation.    Article 23.5 of the FTL gives the KFTC authority to review and approve such a 
code for compliance with the FTL, upon request from the trade association.    The KFTC has 
exercised  this  authority  for  the  initial  version  of  the  KPMA/KRPIA  Codes  as  well  as  their 
subsequent incarnations. 
In  a  nutshell,  the  KPMA/KRPIA  Codes  effectively  prohibit  drug  manufacturers  and 
distributors from giving hospitals or healthcare professionals cash, goods or any other economic 
                                                                    
10  KFTC 3
rd Round Investigation into Pharma Kickbacks. Yonhap News (March 31, 2009, 11:11 AM), 
http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=101&oid=001&aid=0002581494.   
11  The  Codes  will  hereinafter  be  referred  to  as  the  “KPMA  Code”  and  the  “KRPIA  Code,”  respectively, 
and  the  “KPMA/KRPIA  Codes,”  collectively.      
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benefits in connection with the sale of pharmaceutical drugs, unless they are explicitly permitted 
under the KPMA/KRPIA Codes and are within the bounds of normal commercial practice.  The 
KPMA/KRPIA Codes are examined in greater detail below in a separate section. 
 
C.  KFTC Findings   
1.  Generally 
(i)  Emphasis on promotional activity’s relevance to prescription   
In the previous rounds of investigations, the KFTC tended to interpret what is 
considered  “unfair  customer  solicitation”  quite  broadly.    If  the  KFTC  found 
evidence  that  showed  a  certain  benefit  provided  to  a  hospital  or  healthcare 
professional through a promotional activity was “relevant to prescriptions,” i.e., 
intended to influence the purchase or prescription decisions of the recipient hospital 
or  healthcare  professional,  the  KFTC  presumed  that  such  benefit  was  improper 
and/or excessive and hence in violation of the FTL.    Therefore, any activity that 
provides  benefits  to  hospitals  or  healthcare  professionals  may  potentially  be 
deemed to constitute unfair customer solicitation, where there is evidence to link 
that activity to the purchase or prescription decisions for drug(s) being marketed by 
the pharmaceutical company engaging in such activity. 
(ii)  Significance of compliance with the KPMA/KRPIA Codes 
Both  the  KPMA  and  KRPIA  Codes  are  standards  voluntarily  adopted  by 
industry associations and, as such, do not have the status of law.    Consequently, a 
violation of the KPMA or KRPIA Code is not automatically deemed as a violation 
of  the  law.    The  KFTC  has  nevertheless  tended  to  presume  the  illegality  of 
promotional activities which are conducted outside the limits provided for in the 
KPMA/KRPIA Codes or activities which are not provided for in the KPMA/KRPIA 
Codes at all, and the burden shifted to the pharmaceutical company engaging in      
9  /  47 
such  activities  to  rebut  the  presumption.    If  the  company  fails  to  offer  an 
acceptable rebuttal, then the presumption will remain, from a practical perspective.     
It should also be noted that compliance with the monetary limits provided for in 
the  KPMA/KRPIA  Codes  does  not  provide  an  absolute  safe  harbor  for 
pharmaceutical companies.    In other words, even where a company has adhered to 
the monetary limits provided for in the KPMA/KRPIA Codes (e.g., KRW 50,000 
per  person  limit  on  meals  for  healthcare  professionals  attending  product 
presentation meetings hosted by the company), if the KFTC found evidence that the 
activity was intended to influence drug purchase/prescription decisions, the KFTC 
deemed such activity to be a violation of the FTL.
12 
(iii)  “Single Comprehensive Violation” based on a company’s marketing 
plan or a pattern of repetition consisting of benefits provided 
Where the KFTC found what it considers to be evidence of the company’s intent 
to  provide  benefits  to  healthcare  professionals/hospitals  to  influence  drug 
purchase/prescription decisions (such evidence has consisted mostly of marketing 
plans, whether prepared at a company-wide level or limited to specific business 
units or branches) and of the company’s implementation of such intent in the form 
of  various  promotional  activities  through  which  benefits  were  provided  to 
healthcare professionals/hospitals (such evidence has mostly taken the form of daily 
call  reports  submitted  by  sales  reps  or  proposals  and  approval  documents  for 
promotional  expenditures),  the  KFTC  deemed  all  such  activities  as  a  “single 
comprehensive violation” that spans the entire period in which the relevant types of 
promotional activities have been carried out.
13      Even in cases where the KFTC 
found  evidence  that  links  only  a  handful  of  instances  of  any  given  type  of 
                                                                    
12  Korea  Fair  Trade  Commission,  supra  note 2 ;  Press  Release,  Korea  Fair  Trade  Commission,  Corrective 
Action  Against  Unfair  Customer  Solicitation  and  Resale  Price  Maintenance,  Etc.  by  7  Pharmaceutical 
Companies  (Jan.  15,  2009)  (on  file  with  author). 
13  Korea  Fair  Trade  Commission  Decision,  rendered  May  12,  2009,  Case  No.  2007Kyungkyu1858  (available 
on  KFTC  website  http://ftc.go.kr/laws/book/judgeSearch.jsp).   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promotional activity to an intent to improperly influence drug purchase/prescription 
decisions, the KFTC has tended to view such evidence as sufficient to deem illegal 
all instances of the promotional activity in question conducted during the period for 
which marketing plans have been found, based on the general indications in such 
plans to use the type of activity in question to influence drug purchase/prescription 
decisions. 
   
2.  By Type of Activity   
The  KFTC  seems  to  be  of  the  position  that  certain  activities  such  as  golf, 
provision of cash (and cash equivalents, such as gift certificates), and entertainment 
(especially with excessive alcohol) should be deemed straightforward violations for 
which  the  KFTC  will  take  a  bright-line  approach  without  considering  any 
mitigating  factors.    For  promotional  activities  which  are  permitted  subject  to 
certain restrictions under the KPMA/KRPIA Codes, the KFTC has determined such 
activities to be illegal where it has found evidence to suggest that the activity was 
intended  to  influence  the  drug  purchase/prescription  decisions  of  the  recipient 
healthcare professionals/hospitals. 
 
a.  Provision  of  Gift  Certificates,  Cash  and  Payment  for  Golf,  & 
Entertainment at Improper/Adult Venues 
The KFTC’s position appears to be that all activities in this category 
should  be  deemed  straightforward  violations,  and  as  such,  illegal  without 
exception.    For instance, the KFTC has stated with respect to golf that payment 
for  golf  cannot  be  justified  as  being  part  of  social  custom,  since  the 
pharmaceutical company provides it as a quid pro quo for the prescription of its 
products.
14 
                                                                    
14  Korea  Fair  Trade  Commission  Decision,  rendered  December  20,  2007,  Case  No.  2007Kyungkyu1865      
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b.  Provision of Medical Journals and Equipment 
The KPMA/KRPIA Codes in effect at the time of the KFTC’s decisions on 
the first and second round investigations imposed a limit of KRW 300,000 per year 
for provision of medical journals and equipment for research purposes.    The KRPIA 
Code further limits this by providing that the KRW 300,000 per year ceiling applies 
on a per hospital department/clinic (i.e., not individual healthcare professional) basis.   
The KFTC appears to have found violations where the provision of medical journals 
and equipment was in excess of the guideline set by the KPMA/KRPIA Codes.    The 
KFTC’s stated position on this issue in a case in point is that “it is natural in light of 
social conventions that a medical institute should procure equipment, etc. at its own 
expense,  and  the  purpose  for  the  provision  of  equipment  [by  the  pharmaceutical 
company] was to maintain and/or increase the prescription by providing economic 
benefits to hospitals, clinics and their physicians.”
15   
 
c.  Sponsorship  for  Individual  Healthcare  Professional  Attendance  at 
Domestic/Overseas Conferences   
Under the KPMA/KRPIA Codes in effect at the time of the KFTC’s decisions 
on the first and second round investigations, a pharmaceutical company was permitted 
to  sponsor  a  healthcare  professional  to  attend  a  domestic/overseas  academic 
conference,  provided  that  (i)  the  healthcare  professional  is  a  speaker,  presenter, 
moderator or panelist, (ii) the scope of sponsorship is limited to airfare (economy 
class), transportation from the airport to the hotel and back, registration fees, meals 
and accommodations, and (iii) the sponsorship is provided to a publicly recognized 
academic  society  or  research  institution  and  not  paid  directly  to  the  individual 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
(available  on  KFTC  website  http://ftc.go.kr/laws/book/judgeSearch.jsp). 
15  Korea  Fair  Trade  Commission  Decision,  rendered  December  20,  2007,  Case  No.  2007Kyungkyu1861 
(available  on  KFTC  website  http://ftc.go.kr/laws/book/judgeSearch.jsp). 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healthcare professionals who are being sponsored.    The KFTC found sponsorships 
which do not meet the above criteria to be in violation of the FTL.    In particular, 
payments for family members to accompany healthcare professionals or for healthcare 
professionals to engage in golf outings, tours and other forms of recreational activities 
as part of sponsoring conference attendance were found illegal.
16    
 
d.  Financial Donations 
The KPMA/KRPIA Codes in effect at the time of the KFTC’s decisions on 
the  first  and  second  round  investigations  only  permitted  financial  donations  to 
publicly recognized academic societies or research institutions (e.g., those approved 
by  the  Ministry  for  Health  and  Welfare  or  recognized  by  the  Korea  Medical 
Association, Korea Dental Association, etc.).    In other words, financial donations to 
hospitals  and  other  medical  institutions  were  not  among  the  types  of  benefits 
permitted under the KPMA/KRPIA Codes.    In line with this principle, the KFTC 
applied  a  heightened  level  of  scrutiny  to  donations  made  directly  to  hospitals  or 
universities/medical  schools  that  are  affiliated  with  certain  hospitals.    Against  the 
general guiding principle stated above, the KFTC tended to make the determination of 
illegality on donations on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the totality of 
circumstances including the existence of any evidence indicating that the donation 
was made with the intent to influence drug purchase decisions of the recipient.
17   
 
e.  Speaker Fees/Advisory or Consulting Service Fees 
The KRPIA Code was amended in 2007 to provide for a KRW 500,000 
                                                                    
16  Korea  Fair  Trade  Commission  Decision,  rendered  December  20,  2007,  Case  No.  2007Kyungkyu1867 
(available  on  KFTC  website  http://ftc.go.kr/laws/book/judgeSearch.jsp). 
17  Korea  Fair  Trade  Commission  Decision,  rendered  December  20,  2007,  Case  No.  2007Kyungkyu1862 
(available  on  KFTC  website  http://ftc.go.kr/laws/book/judgeSearch.jsp);  Korea  Fair  Trade  Commission 
Decision,  rendered  December  20,  2007,  Case  No.  2007Kyungkyu1872  (available  on  KFTC  website 
http://ftc.go.kr/laws/book/judgeSearch.jsp).      
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ceiling on honoraria payments to healthcare professionals for lectures up to one 
hour in length.    The KPMA Code, on the other hand, was silent on the issue of 
honoraria  payments.
18  The  above  amendment  to  the  KRPIA  Code  was  not 
reviewed or approved by the KFTC.    As such, while the KRW 500,000 ceiling 
may have been considered by the KFTC as one of the factors in determining 
what constitutes reasonable and fair market value, keeping payments to under 
KRW 500,000 did not guarantee that such payments would be viewed as lawful.     
The KFTC has been particularly sensitive to internal documents found 
in multinational pharmaceutical companies which indicate that the companies 
segment healthcare professionals into different groups or grades according to 
perceived importance in terms of influence on purchase/prescription decisions 
regarding  the  company’s  products  and  “manage”  the  different  grades  of 
healthcare professionals using different promotional tools, such as the payment 
of speaker fees or advisory/consulting service fees.
19    The KFTC also appears 
to have taken into consideration the frequency of speaker or advisory/consulting 
engagements  entered  into  by  the  company  and  the  total  amount  of  fees 
expended  for  such  engagements  in  determining  the  legality  of  such  fee 
payments.
20   
 
f.  Educational Meetings Hosted by Companies for Healthcare Professionals 
For product presentation meetings, symposia or lectures organized by 
pharmaceutical companies for healthcare professionals, the organizing company 
was  permitted  under  the  KPMA/KRPIA  Codes  in  effect  at  the  time  of  the 
KFTC’s  decisions  on  the  first  and  second  round  investigations  to  provide 
                                                                    
18  The  current  versions  of  the  KPMA/KRPIA  Codes  do  not  contain  any  provisions  on  speaker  fees  or 
consulting  fees. 
19  Korea  Fair  Trade  Commission,  supra  note  12.   
20  Id.      
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meals/beverages and/or souvenirs, each not exceeding KRW 50,000 per person, 
and  support  costs  for  domestic  travel  and  accommodations  for  attending 
healthcare professionals by reimbursing actual expenses incurred.    The KFTC 
tended  to  view  such  meetings  as  being  prone  to  abuse  by  pharmaceutical 
companies  which  use  them  as  a  pretext  for  the  actual  purpose  of  providing 
meals  and  entertainment  to  healthcare  professionals  to  influence  their 
prescriptions.    Accordingly, where the KFTC found evidence indicating that 
the meeting in question was held with the primary intent to provide benefits to 
healthcare professionals in the form of meals rather than providing valuable 
scientific information on the company’s products/related diseases, the KFTC 
found such meetings to be illegal, even in cases where the KRW 50,000 per 
person limit was adhered to.
21   
 
g.  Post-Marketing Surveillance   
The  KFTC  has  applied  a  particularly  strict  standard  to  post-marketing 
surveillance  studies  conducted  by  pharmaceutical  companies,  based  on  the 
assumption (widely shared within the industry) that such studies are often used as a 
pretext  for  the  companies  to  provide  cash  payments  to  participating  healthcare 
professionals in the form of service fees, as opposed to being indispensable tools for 
the collection of valuable data on the safety and/or efficacy of drugs post-launch.   
Even in the case of post-marketing surveillance studies mandated under applicable 
laws,  the  KFTC  has  held  that  companies  which  conducted  studies  involving 
significantly more cases than the minimum number of cases required under the law 
(3,000 or 600, depending on the type of drug) or which conducted studies with the 
intent to induce or reward prescriptions of the product in question were in violation of 
the FTL.
22   
                                                                    
21  Korea  Fair  Trade  Commission,  supra  note  16. 
22  Korea  Fair  Trade  Commission,  supra  note  13. 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Regarding  voluntary  post-marketing  surveillance,  i.e.,  post-marketing 
surveillance of drugs which are not required under applicable laws, the KFTC looked 
to  the  following  factors  to  determine  the  legality  of  payments  to  healthcare 
professionals: the number of cases contracted with individual healthcare professionals, 
the  amount  of  payment  per  case  (KRW  50,000  per  case  prescribed  under  the 
KPMA/KRPIA Codes in effect at the time was taken as a general rule of thumb, but 
the  KFTC  found  a  number  of  PMS  studies  to  be  illegal  even  where  the  above 
monetary  limit  was  adhered  to,  based  on  its  review  of  other  factors),  whether  a 
convincing scientific rationale existed for the study, the quantity and quality of the 
data collected (e.g., in case report forms) and how well the company had utilized such 
data, in addition to any indications that the study was intended to induce or reward 
prescriptions of the product in question.
23   
 
h.  Samples     
The KPMA/KRPIA Codes in effect at the time of the first two rounds of 
investigations  permitted  the  giving  of  free  product  samples  to  healthcare 
professionals/hospitals only under very stringent conditions -- in principle, samples 
are permitted only in a minimum packaging unit per healthcare professional on one 
occasion  only  throughout  the  entire  lifecycle  of  the  product.    It  appears  that  the 
KFTC adopted a similarly stringent standard in reviewing the legality of providing 
samples.
24   
 
D.  KFTC Sanctions 
1.  General 
If  a  company  is  found  to  have  violated  the  FTL  with  respect  to  any  of  its 
                                                                    
23  Id. 
24  Korea  Fair  Trade  Commission,  supra  note  2. 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promotional  activities,  the  KFTC  may  impose  (i)  a  corrective  order,  (ii)  public 
announcement of the violation in the daily newspapers and/or (iii) administrative fines in 
the amount of 0.1 ~ 1.0% of the relevant revenues.    In addition to the above, the KFTC 
may refer the company to the prosecutor’s office for further investigation.    If indicted 
by the prosecutor and found guilty by the courts, sanctions may be up to 2 years of 
imprisonment or up to KRW 150 million in criminal fines (the prison term would apply 
only to natural persons, i.e., the responsible managers; the fine may apply to both the 
company and the responsible managers). 
 
2.  Administrative Fine 
For the companies found in violation of the FTL in the first and second rounds 
of investigations, the KFTC determined the administrative fine amount by applying a 
pre-established penalty rate to the “relevant revenue amount” for each product regarding 
which and for the relevant period during which the activities found to be in violation of 
the FTL had occurred. 
 
a.  Relevant Period 
During the first and second round of investigations, the KFTC considered the 
“relevant period” to be the entire period from the date on which the first violation was 
found  for  that  product  until  the  end  date  of  the  period  subject  to  the  KFTC’s 
investigation  (i.e.,  September  30,  2006  in  the  first  and  second  rounds).      The 
KFTC’s  position  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  repeated  benefits  provided 
through the different activities constitute a single comprehensive violation, the effect 
of which lasted up to the end date of the period under investigation.   
 
b.  Relevant Revenues   
In  previous  investigations,  the  KFTC  considered  the  total  revenues      
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earned during the “relevant period” for each of the products for which activities 
had been found to be in violation of the FTL as the “relevant revenues” for the 
purpose of calculating the amount of the fine. This computation method was 
contested  in  the  courts  and  the  Supreme  Court  ultimately  took  a  position 
favorable to the KFTC, as discussed above and again below. 
 
c.  Administrative Fine Rate 
The  amount  of  administrative  fine  is  calculated  by  multiplying  a  pre-
established rate of administrative fine ranging from 0.1% to 1.0% to the “relevant 
revenues.”    The actual rate to be imposed will depend on the “seriousness” of the 
violation as determined by the KFTC.    The range of applicable rates is as follows: 
Seriousness of the Violation  Standard Administrative Fine 
Rate 
Very serious  0.8~1.0 % 
Serious  0.4~0.8 % 
Less serious  0.1~0.4 % 
During the first and second rounds of investigations, the KFTC uniformly 
imposed administrative penalties at the rate of 1.0% on all companies investigated, 
based on the following factors provided for in its internal guidelines: (i) The violation 
caused  or  is  highly  likely  to  cause  severe  damage  to  consumers;  (ii)  Investigated 
companies have 3-year average revenues of 50 billion KRW or more; and (iii) The 
violations have occurred throughout the nation-wide market and therefore should be 
considered “very serious violations.”
25   
 
E.  Court Decisions   
                                                                    
25  Korea  Fair  Trade  Commission  Guidelines  for  Criminal  Referrals  of  Violations  of  the  Monopoly 
Regulation  and  Fair  Trade  Law,  KFTC  Guideline  No.  40  (January  15,  2007).      
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As we noted above, certain pharmaceutical companies subject to the first and second 
rounds of the investigations appealed the KFTC’s decision.    On the whole, the appellate court, 
regardless  of  which  division  heard  the  case,  tended  to  side  with  the  KFTC  on  the  issue  of 
violation  of  law,  recognizing  and  accepting  the  KFTC’s  standard  for  determining  illegality.   
However, the two divisions which reviewed the cases took different approaches to the issue of 
whether  a  number  of  different  types  of  promotional  activities  should  be  deemed  a  “single 
comprehensive violation” based on a handful of instances for which evidence was found linking 
the benefits provided through such activities to an intent to improperly influence prescriptions.   
As discussed above, whether to recognizing a “single comprehensive violation” can make a huge 
difference in the amount of the fine, and by extension, impact the likelihood of the company 
being referred to the prosecutor’s office for a criminal investigation as well as being notified to 
other relevant government agencies for further investigation.     
In the case of Hanmi’s appeal, the Seoul High Court reduced the initial penalty amount 
levied by the KFTC from KRW 5.098 billion to KRW 1.52 billion (approximately US$ 4.54 
million to US$ 1.35 million using current exchange rate) based on grounds that the KFTC had 
incorrectly  calculated  the  administrative  fine  amount.    The  High  Court  ruled  that  the 
administrative fine should be calculated based on the sales related only to the specific unfair 
solicitation  activity  (e.g.,  the  sale  amount  generated  from  providing  excessive  or  improper 
payments for a lecture) for which the KFTC provided sufficient evidence, and it was improper to 
include  all  sales  amounts  generated  from  a  product  simply  based  on  only  a  select  few 
violations.
26   
However, the Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of the Seoul High Court and held 
that it is proper to consider all sales amounts generated by a product as relevant revenues for 
purposes of calculating the fine, if the activities were used to implement an overall sales plan 
(e.g., plans of action commonly referred to as POAs) established by the company for customers 
in general.
27    In other words, the total sales amounts generated by selling a relevant product to 
                                                                    
26  Seoul  High  Court  Decision,  rendered  May  14,  2009,  Case  No.  2008Nu2530  (available  at  Korean 
Supreme  Court  website  http://glaw.scourt.go.kr/jbsonw/jsp/jbsonc/jbsonc08.jsp)  . 
27  Supreme  Court  Decision,  rendered  November  25,  2010,  Case  No.  2009Du9543  (available  at  Korean 
Supreme  Court  website  http://glaw.scourt.go.kr/jbsonw/jsp/jbsonc/jbsonc08.jsp). 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all customers should be considered as relevant revenues, if the marketing or promotional activity 
in question was part of the implementation of a general sales plan. 
In sum, with respect to the method of calculating the administrative fine amount, the 
Supreme Court found that when the marketing activities for a particular product are based on a 
plan and are carried out as part of the implementation of such plan, the appropriate method of 
calculating the administrative fine amount is to use the total revenues generated from the sale of 
that product to all channels and accounts.    This ruling appears to be based on the assumption 
that the authorities would face an unduly heavy burden if required to prove that for each activity, 
out of the many thousands conducted by the company in question, excessive or improper benefits 
were provided for promotional purposes.   
 
III.  Other Agency Involvement   
Other interested government agencies were not slow to follow the KFTC’s lead and 
jump on the anti-kickback bandwagon.    The result was a major overhaul of the country’s laws 
and  regulations  governing  the  marketing  and  sale  of  pharmaceuticals,  with  the  objective  of 
rooting out illicit benefits intended to influence healthcare professionals.    These legislative and 
regulatory developments are discussed below.   
 
A.  Korea Food & Drug Administration 
In December 2008, the Ministry of Health and Welfare revised applicable regulations to 
impose  both  criminal  and  administrative  sanctions  against  pharmaceutical  companies  which 
provided kickbacks to healthcare professionals.    Previously, the Enforcement Regulation to the 
Pharmaceutical Affairs Law had contained the only prohibition on kickbacks specific to the 
pharmaceutical industry.    The relevant provision, which was one of a number of provisions 
listing the obligations of those engaged in the sale of pharmaceuticals, had prohibited “product 
registration holders, importers, and wholesalers of pharmaceuticals” from providing “operators of      
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medical institutions or pharmacies” with “prizes, free gifts, and other giveaways for the purpose 
of promoting the sale of pharmaceuticals.”
28    As an enforcement tool against kickbacks, this 
provision contained serious deficiencies in its language – most problematically, the prohibition 
only on “prizes, free gifts, and other giveaways” and the limitation of recipients to “operators of 
medical institutions or pharmacies,” which left out individual healthcare professionals.    Due to 
the combined effect of such deficiencies and a lack of will on the part of the agency responsible 
for enforcing the regulation, the Korea Food and Drug Administration (“KFDA”), this provision 
had  never  been  enforced  against  pharmaceutical  companies  for  providing  illicit  benefits  to 
healthcare professionals or hospitals.     
After the 2008 amendments, the provision read as follows: “Product registration holders, 
importers,  and  wholesalers  of  pharmaceuticals  shall  not  provide  healthcare  professionals,  or 
operators  of  medical  institutions  or  pharmacies  with  money,  goods,  conveniences,  labor, 
entertainment,  or  any  other  economic  benefits  for  the  purpose  of  promoting  the  sale  of 
pharmaceuticals.”
29  Violations would be subject to varying degrees of administrative sanctions, 
depending on the frequency of the violation: 1-month, 3-month, 6-month suspension of sale of 
the  relevant  product  for  first-time,  second-time,  and  third-time  violations,  respectively,  and 
cancellation  of  the  relevant  product  registration  for  fourth-time  violations.
30    Under  the 
amended provision, the KFDA could now impose sanctions on pharmaceutical companies for 
providing illicit benefits, regardless of form or substance, to individual healthcare professionals. 
Despite being granted this new enforcement tool against kickbacks, the KFDA lacked 
the institutional expertise and experience to vigorously pursue violators, not to mention search 
and seizure powers necessary for the effective investigation of alleged kickbacks.    It was not 
until the Central Investigations Unit (“CIU”) was formed within the KFDA in February 2009 that 
the amended regulation started to have bite.    The CIU began as a temporary task force, headed 
                                                                    
28  Enforcement  Regulation  to  the  Pharmaceutical  Affairs  Law,  Article  62(1)-5. 
29  Enforcement  Regulation  to  the  Pharmaceutical  Affairs  Law,  Article  62(1)-5,  as  revised  by  Ministry  of 
Health,  Welfare,  and  Family  Affairs  Order  No.  77,  dated  December  1,  2008. 
30  Addendum  8  to  the  Enforcement  Regulation  to  the  Pharmaceutical  Affairs  Law,  II.  35(h).      
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by a prosecutor seconded from the Seoul Central District Public Prosecutor’s Office and staffed 
with KFDA investigative personnel, but formally became a part of the KFDA in April 2009.
31  
It  was  modeled  after  the  Office  of  Criminal  Investigations  within  the  U.S.  Food  and  Drug 
Administration and has jurisdiction to investigate violations of the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law 
and  the  Food  Sanitation  Law,  two  main  statutes  for  which  the  KFDA  has  enforcement 
authority.
32  The CIU is responsible for conducting and coordinating criminal investigations 
into a broad spectrum of crimes relating to food and drugs and was not formed with a specific 
mandate to focus on pharmaceutical industry kickbacks to healthcare professionals.    However, 
driven by the government’s firm determination to root out longstanding illicit practices in the 
healthcare  sector  and  broad-based  public  for  such  efforts,  the  CIU  has  emerged  during  its 
relatively short existence as a significant force in uncovering kickback schemes, resulting in 
penalties for the relevant companies under the amended regulation.
33   
   
B.  Ministry of Health & Welfare   
In January 2009, the Ministry of Health and Welfare
34  amended reimbursement pricing 
                                                                    
31  Joo-Ho  Park,  Safety  of  Food  and  Drugs  Should  Meet  Consumer  Expectations.  Kookmin  Ilbo,  Kooki  News 
(December  22,  2009,  10:07  AM), 
http://news.kukinews.com/article/view.asp?page=1&gCode=kmi&arcid=1261476336&cp=nv.     
32  Id.    However,  unlike  its  American  counterpart,  the  CIU  does  not  have  jurisdiction  to  investigate 
violations  of  laws  governing  medical  devices  and  cosmetics,  two  other  sectors  over  which  the  KFDA  has 
jurisdiction.     
33  Se-Ho  Lim,  CIU  First  Anniversary  of  Launch,  Total  669  Food  and  Drug  Law  Violators  Rounded  Up  in 
First  Year  of  Operation.  Yakup  Shinmun  (May  17,  2010,  14:25  PM), 
http://www.yakup.com/news/index.html?mode=view&cat=11&nid=130994;  Seung-Hyun  Chun,  Youngjin 
Pharmaceuticals  Found  to  Have  Given  Kickbacks,  Chooses  to  Pay  KRW  50  Million  in  Administrative  Fine. 
EDaily  (March  19,  2010,  08:14  AM), 
http://www.edaily.co.kr/news/NewsRead.edy?SCD=DC14&newsid=01312006592904960&DCD=A00204&OutLnk
Chk=Y;  Myung-Ryong  Kim,  Prosecutor’s  Office,  Police,  KFTC  Close  in  from  All  Sides  on  Pharma 
Company  Kickbacks  .  Money  Today  (April  4,  2011,  17:05  PM), 
http://www.mt.co.kr/view/mtview.php?type=1&no=2011040415503299207&outlink=1. 
34  The  Korean  health  ministry  was  previously  named  Ministry  of  Health,  Welfare,  and  Family  Affairs, 
before  its  name  was  changed  to  Ministry  of  Health  and  Welfare,  effective  March  19,  2011,  as  part  of  an 
administrative  reshuffling  of  various  ministry  functions. 
http://news.hankooki.com/lpage/politics/201003/h2010030916325421000.htm        
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rules for drugs covered by the National Health Insurance Program, effective August 1, 2009, to 
include “interference with the orderly distribution of drugs by such means as providing money or 
other valuables to promote sales” as one of the grounds on which the Ministry could reduce the 
maximum reimbursement price of a drug.
35  Under a separate attendant regulation issued by the 
Ministry, the rate of price reduction is to be calculated by dividing the Korean Won amount of 
kickbacks or other illicit benefits provided to the recipient medical institution by the Korean 
Won amount of the prescriptions written for (or the purchases made of) the relevant product(s) 
by the recipient, with the rate not to exceed 20% of the current reimbursement price.
36     
This new rule, dubbed the “kickback-drug price linkage,” has been widely criticized as 
being unworkable in practice despite its laudable objective, primarily in light of the potential 
overkill factor (a single instance of a small kickback to a physician can result in a catastrophic 
price  reduction  of  the  company’s  bestselling  product)  and  the  difficulty  of  identifying  the 
product(s) for which kickbacks or illicit benefits were provided (kickbacks are often provided, 
particularly when the recipients are hospitals, with a view to inducing or rewarding prescriptions 
for  a  company’s  line-up  of  products  across  the  board,  rather  than  for  a  single  product).
37   
However, it is reasonable to expect that the deterrent effect of this rule would be significant, 
particularly since it has the potential to hit pharmaceutical companies where they would feel the 
most hurt, i.e., their bottom lines.     
The  basic  assumption  on  which  the  Ministry  has  adopted  this  “linkage”  is  that  the 
National Health Insurance Program should not be funding pharmaceutical companies’ kickbacks 
by sustaining drug reimbursement prices at unwarrantedly high levels and this assumption seems 
to be shared by the current Administration of President Myung-Bak Lee and the majority of the 
public.
38    In  announcing  the  adoption  of  this  new  rule,  the  Ministry  stated  that  it  would 
                                                                    
35  Regulation  on  Standards  for  National  Health  Insurance  Reimbursement  (Ministry  of  Health  and  Welfare 
Enforcement  Regulation),  Article  13.11. 
36  Standards  for  Price  Reduction  of  Drugs  Interfering  with  Orderly  Distribution  (Ministry  of  Health  and 
Welfare  Notification). 
37  Eun-Taek  Choi,  20%  Reduction  to  be  Expected  for  Drugs  Found  to  Have  Been  Tied  to  Kickbacks. 
Dailypharm  (April  15,  2011,  12:30  PM),  http://www.dreamdrug.com/Users/News/NewsView.html?ID=139863.   
38  Press  Release  Ministry  of  Health,  Welfare,  and  Family  Affairs,  (July  30,  2009)  (on  file  with  author). 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strengthen its system for monitoring the marketing and sale of drugs and also establish a close-
knit network of cooperation with the police/public prosecutor’s office and the KFTC, which 
would enable the Ministry to utilize the results of investigations undertaken by these agencies in 
the  application  of  the  new  drug  pricing  rule.
39    The  expectation  in  applying  the  new  rule, 
according to the Ministry, is that it would help bring about greater transparency in drug sales, 
thereby  enabling  the  funds  used  for  kickbacks  to  be  channeled  into  R&D  and  quality 
improvement, resulting in greater competitiveness of the Korean pharmaceutical industry as a 
whole and reducing the burden of drug costs on taxpayers.
40  The new rule has yet to be applied 
in practice, but in light of the above factors, it can reasonably be assumed that the “linkage” is 
here to stay and will soon find targets. 
 
C.  Police/Public Prosecutors’ Office 
Providing kickbacks or other illegal benefits provided to healthcare professionals for the 
purpose of inducing or rewarding prescriptions or sales can constitute official bribery, in cases 
where the recipient is an employee of a government hospital, or commercial bribery, where the 
recipient  is  an  employee  of  a  privately-owned  hospital,  both  punishable  offenses  under  the 
Korean Criminal Code.
41  Both the giver and the recipient are subject to punishment under the 
relevant provisions.
42   
These tools have always been available to Korea’s police and prosecutors, but in recent 
years, particularly after the start of KFTC investigations and enforcement actions, the police and 
the  public  prosecutors’  office  have  also  stepped  up  efforts  to  investigate  and  prosecute 
individuals  alleged  to  have  given  or  received  bribes  in  the  context  of  interactions  between 
pharmaceutical  companies  and  healthcare  professionals.
43    Indictments  appear  to  have  been 
                                                                    
39  Id. 
40  Id. 
41  Criminal  Code,  Articles  129(1),  357(2). 
42  Criminal  Code,  Article  133(1),  357(2). 
43  Eun-Taek  Choi,  Prosecutors’  Office  or  KFTC?  Confusing…  Dailypharm  (April  8,  2011,  06:49  AM),      
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considerably fewer, though, than the reported instances of investigations undertaken suggest, and 
fewer still of such indictments have been sustained by the courts.    This can likely be attributed 
to the far more stringent elements of the violations under the Criminal Code and the standards 
proof required in criminal cases.    A notable exception is the recent “contrast media case,” where 
the Seoul District Police, acting on the tip of a whistleblower, investigated 355 physicians on 
allegations of receiving kickbacks from four contrast media companies (three multinational, one 
domestic) in the form of services fee payments for sham post-marketing surveillance studies.
44  
Of the physicians investigated, the prosecutor eventually issued indictments against 3 physicians, 
in addition to 6 executives of the relevant companies, and suspended indictments against 41 of 
the doctors, taking mitigating factors (e.g., small amount received) into account.
45    
Efforts by the police and prosecutors have appear to have gained renewed steam in 
recent months with the adoption of the “Dual Punishment System,” discussed below.       
 
D.  Adoption of “Dual Punishment System” 
In November 2010, the so-called “Dual Punishment System” was adopted to impose 
criminal sanctions not only on givers but also on recipients of illicit benefits.    In addition to the 
provision in the Enforcement Regulation to the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act, which was amended 
in 2008 to enable enforcement against pharmaceutical companies for providing kickbacks to 
individual healthcare professionals (discussed above), a new provision was inserted to allow 
enforcement against the recipients, i.e., “pharmacists and oriental medicine pharmacists” who 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
http://www.dreamdrug.com/Users/News/NewsView.html?ID=139475;  Byung-Ki  Min,  High  Intensity  Probe  Into 
Kickbacks:  Three  Types  of  Responses  from  Industry.  Munhwa.com  (April  6,  2011,  14:09  PM), 
http://www.munhwa.com/news/view.html?no=2011040601031524237004. 
44  Do-Kyung  Lee,  355  “Kickback  Doctors”  Uncovered;  They  Received  Cash,  Golf  Outings,  and  Even  Got 
Expenses  Paid  for  Mother-In-Law’s  60
th  Birthday.  Kooki  News  (February  26,  2008,  19:04  PM), 
http://news.kukinews.com/article/view.asp?page=1&gCode=kmi&arcid=0920823516&cp=nv;  Dong-Keun  Lee, 
Contrast  Media  Kickback  Taking  Doctors,  41  Get  Their  Licenses  Suspended.  Health  Korea  News  (March  2, 
2009,  18:16  PM),  http://www.hkn24.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=23407.     
45  Id.      
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received such kickbacks.
46    A corresponding provision was inserted into the Medical Services 
Law, to enable enforcement against “healthcare professionals, operators of medical institutions, 
and  employees  of  medical  institutions”  who  received  kickbacks  from  pharmaceutical 
companies.
47    Recipients may be punished by imprisonment of up to 2 years or a criminal fine 
of  up  to  KRW  30  million,  along  with  confiscation  of  the  benefits  received.
48    These 
amendments represented a sea change to the relevant laws, which for the first time provided 
expressly for criminal sanctions against healthcare professionals for receiving kickbacks from 
industry. 
 
IV.  Revised Industry Codes 
A.  Overview – KPMA and KRPIA   
The  Korea  Pharmaceutical  Manufacturers’  Association  (“KPMA”)  and  the  Korea 
Research-Based  Pharmaceutical  Industry  Association  (“KRPIA”)  are  the  two  pharmaceutical 
industry trade associations in Korea.    The KPMA mainly comprises domestic pharmaceutical 
companies, while the KRPIA exclusively comprises multinational pharmaceutical companies.     
The KPMA Code was first adopted in 1994 and amended in 2001, mainly in response to 
calls from member companies to raise the monetary ceilings for meals provided to healthcare 
professionals.    The  KPMA  Code  underwent  a  major  overhaul  in  2009,  when  the  KPMA 
leadership  sought  to  incorporate  new,  far-reaching  restrictions  on  the  entire  spectrum  of 
promotional  activities,  in  order  to  placate  the  KFTC  after  its  recent  aggressive  enforcement 
efforts and to address the broad-based criticism of industry practices that the KFTC’s findings 
had engendered in the public.    Behind-the-scenes discussions between the KPMA leadership 
and the KFTC and much wrangling among the member companies produced another round of 
amendments in 2010, resulting in the version that is currently in effect.    All incarnations of the 
                                                                    
46  Pharmaceutical  Affairs  Law,  Article  47(3). 
47  Medical  Services  Law,  Article  23-2. 
48  Medical  Services  Law,  Article  88-2,  Pharmaceutical  Affairs  Law,  Article  94-2. 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KPMA Code have been reviewed and approved by the KFTC, the latest version having been 
approved on December 17, 2010 and become effective on December 20, 2010.     
The KRPIA was formed much later than the KPMA and the KRPIA Code was first 
adopted in 2006.    The KRPIA Code, too, underwent similar revisions in the aftermath of the 
KFTC’s enforcement actions.    The current version, which differs slightly from the KPMA Code, 
reflecting  the  different  market  conditions  for  and  the  resulting  difference  in  focus  of  the 
multinational companies’ marketing efforts, was adopted in January 2011 and approved by the 
KFTC on January 11, 2011.   
 
B.  Basic Principles 
The KPMA/KRPIA Codes set forth the basic principles that govern pharmaceutical 
marketing activities: (i) such activities should be conducted within the bounds of applicable laws, 
including the FTL, and socially accepted commercial practice; (ii) Companies should endeavor 
to deliver to healthcare professionals scientific and educational information on products and 
maximize benefits to patients, provided that such endeavors should not interfere with the 
independent decision-making of healthcare professionals regarding the prescription of drugs; (iii) 
marketing activities should take place at venues appropriate to the purpose of such activities; and 
(iv) book-keeping and other financial management should be based on applicable laws and 
generally accepted accounting principles, be factually accurate and transparent.
49 
 
This is broadly comparable to the principles set forth in the Preamble and beginning 
sections of the PhRMA Code, which emphasize that companies’ interactions with healthcare 
professionals should benefit patients and enhance the practice of medicine
50  and that a 
healthcare professional’s care of patients should be based, and should be perceived as being 
based, solely on each patient’s medical needs and the healthcare professional’s medical 
                                                                    
49  KPMA  Code  Art.  2,  KRPIA  Code  Art.  2. 
50  PhRMA  Code  on  Interactions  with  Healthcare  Professionals  2,  4  (2009).      
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knowledge and experience.
51    The emphasis on accurate and transparent book-keeping in the 
KPMA/KRPIA Codes is intended to address the widespread concern shared by Korean 
authorities that companies have engaged in accounting irregularities and doctoring their books to 
hide expenses incurred for illicit promotional activities.
52     
 
C.  Definitions   
The KPMA/KRPIA Codes contain a separate section on definitions of terms used, the most 
significant of which are outlined below:
53 
-  “Drugs” are (i) prescription drugs and (ii) over-the-counter (“OTC”) drugs which are 
reimbursable under the National Health Insurance Plan (“NHIP”), both as defined under 
the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act.
54    Accordingly, promotional activities relating to OTC 
drugs which are not reimbursable under the NHIP are technically not covered by the 
KPMA/KRPIA Codes.    It is unclear why the definition leaves out a broad category of 
drugs, many of which are not reimbursable under NHIP, but this definition has remained 
the same in all incarnations of the KPMA/KRPIA Codes. It may reflect the assumption 
on the part of the initial drafters that only prescription drugs, because the requirement of 
a  physician’s  prescription  created  an  agency  problem,  and  reimbursable  OTC  drugs, 
because their purchases were being funded at least in part by taxpayer money, through 
the  NHIP,  should  be  subject  to  the  regulation  of  promotional  activities.    While  the 
language does seem to suggest a potential loophole, it does not seem likely that the 
KFTC or any other enforcement agency would be willing to let companies exploit this 
                                                                    
51  PhRMA  Code  on  Interactions  with  Healthcare  Professionals  2  (2009);  Howard  L.  Dorfman,  The  2009 
revision  to  the  PhRMA  Code  on  Interactions  with  Healthcare  Professionals:  Challenges  and  Opportunities  for 
the  Pharmaceutical  Industry  in  the  Age  of  Compliance,  31  Campbell  L.  Rev.  361,  361-362  (2008-2009). 
52  Press  Release,  Korea  Fair  Trade  Commission,  Standard  Fair  Competition  Code  Adopted  for 
Pharmaceutical  Industry  (Dec.  24,  2009)  (on  file  with  author). 
53  The  terms  whose  definitions  discussed  below  are  capitalized  hereinafter,  in  discussing  the  relevant 
provisions  of  the  KPMA/KRPIA  Codes.     
54  KPMA  Code,  Art.  3(1),  KRPIA  Code,  Art.  3(1). 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and argue for a more lenient standard to be applied to promotional activities for non-
reimbursable OTC drugs, only based on the definition contained in the KPMA/KRPIA 
Codes.    The KFTC seems to be taking the view that no distinction is warranted between 
reimbursable and non-reimbursable OTC drugs, with respect to the enforcement of the 
FTL.
55   
-  “Company/Companies” refers to any entity in the business of manufacturing and selling 
or importing and selling drugs after having obtained the requisite licenses.
56 
-  “Healthcare Professionals” are doctors, dentists, oriental medicine doctors, pharmacists, 
and oriental medicine pharmacists.
57    Nurses are not included in the scope of Healthcare 
Professionals. 
-  “Donation” refers to any act by a Company of providing Money or Other Valuables,
58 
without consideration, to medical institutions, schools, or agencies/organizations which 
conduct academic or other research or engage in academia-industry cooperative efforts 
(hereinafter, collectively “Medical Institutions”).
59 
-  “Academic  Conference”  is  any  event  held  for  the  purpose  of  supporting  medical  or 
pharmaceutical  research  and  education  of  Healthcare  Professionals  by  providing 
Healthcare  Professionals  with  medicine/pharmacy-related  scientific  or  educational 
information,  excluding  any  event  which  is  in  substance  hosted  by  a  Company.
60  
Among  Academic  Conferences,  a  “Domestically-held  International  Academic 
Conference” is an academic conference of an international scale held in Korea, for two 
(2) or more days, attended by Healthcare Professionals from five (5) or more countries 
                                                                    
55  Q&A  Session  with  Jin-Wook  Chung,  Division  Head,  Anti-Monopoly  Division  (Manufacturing),  Anti-
Monopoly  Bureau,  KFTC,  at  Information  Session  on  the  Amended  KPMA  Code  (March  31,  2010). 
56  KPMA  Code,  Art.  3(2),  KRPIA  Code,  Art.  3(2). 
57  KPMA  Code,  Art.  3(5),  KRPIA  Code,  Art.  3(5). 
58  As  defined  below,  in  KPMA  Code,  Art.  3(12),  KRPIA  Code,  Art.  3(12). 
59  KPMA  Code,  Art.  3(7),  KRPIA  Code,  Art.  3(7). 
60  KPMA  Code,  Art.  3(8),  KRPIA  Code,  Art.  3(8).      
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(Healthcare Professionals from five (5) or more countries attending as audience, not as 
presenter, chair or panelist, must come to Korea) or by participants of whom 150 or more 
are foreigners, and recognized by a medical doctors’ association, dentists’ association, or 
oriental medical doctors’ association, defined under the Medical Services Law, or by the 
Korean Pharmaceutical Association or the Korea Oriental Pharmacy Association, defined 
under  the  Pharmaceutical  Affairs  Law,  as  an  international  academic  conference. 
“International Academy” is an academy recognized by a medical doctors’ association, 
dentists’ association, or oriental medical doctors’ association, defined under the Medical 
Services  Law,  or  by  the  Korean  Pharmaceutical  Association  or  the  Korea  Oriental 
Pharmacy Association, defined under the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law, as an international 
academy, 100 or more of whose regular members are foreigners from five (5) or more 
countries.
61 
 
-  “Product Informational Presentation” is (i) an event held in Korea by a Company for the 
Healthcare Professionals of multiple medical institutions for the purpose of providing 
information  on  its  own  pharmaceuticals  or  (ii)  the  providing  of  information  by  a 
Company on its pharmaceuticals to the Healthcare Professional(s) of individual medical 
institutions on visits to such institutions.
62 
 
-  “Market Survey” is the collecting by a Company of data relating to the market and the 
scope and characteristics of its components, including consumer demands.
63 
 
-  “Post-Marketing Surveillance” is any study conducted by a Company for the collection 
of data on safety, efficacy, or proper use of a drug which is subject to re-examination as 
mandated under the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law, during the mandated re-examination 
                                                                    
61  KPMA  Code,  Art.  3(8),  KRPIA  Code,  Art.  3(8). 
62  KPMA Code, Art. 3(9), KRPIA Code, Art. 3(9). 
63  KPMA Code, Art. 3(10), KRPIA Code, Art. 3(10). 
      
30  /  47 
period.
64    
 
-  “Money or Other Valuables” is any kind of economic benefit provided by a Company to 
a Medical Institution or a Healthcare Professional, including, but not limited to, goods, 
money, gift certificates, securities or other written promises of payment, entertainment 
(including food/beverage, invitation to or preferential treatment to any movie, play, or 
other  performance  or  sports  event,  travel,  golf,  or  ski),  transportation,  lodging, 
registration for academic conferences, labor or any other service, discounts, free goods or 
sales  incentives  (excluding  discounts  pursuant  to  terms  of  payment  or  points 
accumulated for the use of credit/debit cards, as permitted under the Medical Services 
Law or the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law).
65   
 
D.  Restriction on Providing Money or Other Valuables   
The basic rule is that a Company must not provide any Money or Other Valuables to a 
Medical  Institution  or  a  Healthcare  Professional,  unless  the  provision  of  Money  or  Other 
Valuables is (i) permitted under any one of Articles 6 through 15 of the KPMA/KRPIA Codes 
and within the boundaries of socially accepted normal commercial practice,
66  or (ii) permitted 
by the Ministry of Health and Welfare pursuant to the relevant provisions in the Medical Services 
Law or the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law.
67   
Any provision of Money or Other Valuables to a Medical Institution or a Healthcare 
Professional by a domestic or overseas affiliated entity of a Company, at the request of that 
                                                                    
64  KPMA Code, Art. 3(11), KRPIA Code, Art. 3(11); The Pharmaceutical Affairs Law mandates post-marketing 
surveillance for a statutorily-prescribed period of 4 or 6 years for certain types of new drugs once they are approved 
for marketing in Korea.    The manufacturer/importer of the drug in question must collect and submit certain data to 
the Korea Food & Drug Administration. Pharmaceutical Affairs Law Art. 32, Art. 42(4). 
65  KPMA Code, Art. 3(12), KRPIA Code, Art. 3(12). 
66  KPMA  Code,  Art.  5(1),  KRPIA  Code,  Art.  5(1). 
67  KPMA  Code,  Art.  5(2),  KRPIA  Code,  Art.  5(2).      
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Company, or any such provision when that Company knew or could have known about it but 
willfully or negligently failed to prevent it is deemed a provision by that Company.
68    The same 
deemer clause applies to any provision of Money or Other Valuables to a Medical Institution or a 
Healthcare Professional by a wholesaler or marketing agency (commissioned by the Company to 
carry out promotional activities) at the request of or with the actual knowledge or negligent 
ignorance  of  the  Company.
69    The  deemer  clauses,  newly  inserted  into  the  KPMA/KRPIA 
Codes in the recent rounds of amendments represent an attempt to clamp down on the indirect 
provision of illicit benefits, which the KFTC pointed out as being widespread in the industry.
70   
The  basic  rule,  then,  is  that  a  pharmaceutical  company  cannot  provide  any  kind  of 
economic benefit to a healthcare professional or hospital, unless the provision falls into any of 
the express exceptions recognized under the KPMA/KRPIA Codes or the relevant regulations 
issued by the Ministry of Health and Welfare.    This is considerably more stringent than the rules 
provided for in the PhRMA Code.    The exceptions to the basic rule are discussed below. 
 
E.  Free Drug Samples 
A  Company  may  provide  product  samples  to  a  Medical  Institution  or  a  Healthcare 
Professional,  free  of  charge,  but  only  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  identification  of  such 
characteristics of the drug as formulation, color, taste, or scent, and only in units clearly marked 
as “sample”, in the minimum amount necessary for such identification.
71  Accordingly, giving 
healthcare professionals free drug samples for any other purpose, for example, to be provided to 
patients, would be in violation of the KPMA/KRPIA Codes. 
                                                                    
68  KPMA  Code,  Art.  5(3),  KPMA  Code  Working  Guidelines,  Art.  2(1),  KRPIA  Code,  Art.  5(3),  KRPIA 
Code  Working  Guidelines,  Art.  2(1). 
69  KPMA  Code,  Art.  5(3),  KPMA  Code  Working  Guidelines,  Art.  2(2),  KRPIA  Code,  Art.  5(3),  KRPIA 
Code  Working  Guidelines,  Art.  2(2). 
70  Korea  Fair  Trade  Commission,  supra  note  56. 
71  KPMA  Code,  Art.  6,  KPMA  Code  Working  Guidelines,  Art.  3,  KRPIA  Code,  Art.  6,  KRPIA  Code 
Working  Guidelines,  Art.  3.      
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F.  Donations   
The KPMA/KRPIA Codes outline a detailed procedure which a Company must adhere 
to  if  it  wishes  to  make  a  Donation  for  a  medical/pharmacological/educational,  or  charitable 
purpose.    Notwithstanding  the  definition  of  “Donation  in  the  KPMA/KRPIA  Codes,  which 
suggests that hospitals can be recipients, the Working Guidelines to the KPMA/KRPIA Codes 
restrict  the  scope  of  permissible  recipients  to  non-profit  organizations  established  for  the 
academic  or  research  purposes  and  not  subordinate  to  any  specific  hospital  or  medical 
institution.
72  An exception is recognized for donations of drugs for charitable purposes, which 
can  be  made  to  hospitals  and  other  medical  institutions,  subject  to  certain  procedural 
requirements.
73   
A Company that wishes to make a Donation cannot choose the recipient itself but must 
request the KPMA/KRPIA to select a recipient.
74  The KPMA/KRPIA is required, in selecting 
the recipient, to respect the donor Company’s stated purpose of the Donation and may, at its 
discretion, permit the donor Company to present its opinion to the KPMA/KRPIA as part of the 
deliberation process.
75  The actual deliberation and decision-making are tasked to an internal 
body  within  the  KPMA/KRPIA,  called  the  Code  Deliberation  Committee.
76  If  the  donor 
Company objects to the KPMA/KRPIA’s decision regarding the recipient, the donor Company 
may withdraw its request for selection of a recipient within five days of receiving notification of 
the KPMA/KRPIA’s decision.
77  An exception to the above procedure is recognized in cases 
where an organization submits a donation request to the KPMA/KRPIA to fund a project (e.g., 
                                                                    
72  KPMA  Code  Working  Guidelines,  Art.  4(1),  KRPIA  Code  Working  Guidelines,  Art.  4(6). 
73  KPMA  Code,  Art.  7(4),  KPMA  Code  Working  Guidelines,  Art.  4(7),  KRPIA  Code,  Art.  7(4),  KRPIA 
Code  Working  Guidelines,  Art.  4(7). 
74  KPMA  Code  7(1)-2,  KRPIA  Code  7(1)-2. 
75  KPMA  Code  7(2),  KRPIA  Code  7(2). 
76  KPMA  Code  16(1),  KRPIA  Code  16(1). 
77  KPMA  Code  Working  Guidelines,  Art.  4(2)-4,  KRPIA  Code  Working  Guidelines,  Art.  4(2)-5.      
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awarding  academic  prizes,  academic  campaigns),  in  which  case  the  KPMA/KRPIA,  if  it 
determines the project to be appropriate, solicits offers from potential donor Companies and 
chooses the donor.
78  Other than by adhering to these procedures, a Company is prohibited from 
making a donation directly to a medical institution or a healthcare professional.
79 
Donations are not permitted if (i) a benefit has been promised relating to the formulary 
listing,  prescription,  or  purchase  of  the  donor  Company’s  drug;  (ii)  the  donor  Company  is 
responding to a request for a donation from the intended recipient, in consideration of potential 
effects on the formulary listing, prescription, or purchase of the donor Company’s drug; (iii) if 
the  Donation  is  intended  to  be  used  to  fund  real  estate/equipment  purchases,  expansion  or 
renovation of facilities, management, or any other expenditure that is recognized by social norms 
as one that should be borne by the intended recipient; or (iv) Donations are being provided 
repeatedly and continuously to the same recipient without justifiable cause.
80   
Donations,  as  defined  in  the  KPMA/KRPIA  Codes,  are  outside  the  purview  of  the 
PhRMA Code. Moreover, the elaborate procedure required for a company to make a donation, 
involving the KPMA/KRPIA in a central role, is unlike anything provided for in the PhRMA 
Code.    The provisions on Donations are a good example of the impact that the recent KFTC 
enforcement actions have had on the compliance environment in the Korean healthcare industry.   
As discussed above, financial donations made by companies, to hospitals in particular, were a 
contentious  issue  during  the  first  two  rounds  of  investigations  and  enforcement  actions 
undertaken  by  the  KFTC.    Such  donations  were  widespread  in  the  industry  and  widely 
recognized  as  being  tied  to  hospital  formulary  listing  or  purchase  decisions.    However,  the 
KFTC ultimately decided not to condemn them on a per se basis, instead applying a case-by-case 
analysis of legality, in part because it recognized the positive role that donations play in fostering 
medical research.     
These newly inserted provisions of the KPMA/KRPIA Codes represent an effort on the 
                                                                    
78  KPMA  Code  7(1)-3,  KRPIA  Code  7(1)-3. 
79  KPMA  Code  7(1)-4,  KRPIA  Code  7(1)-4. 
80  KPMA  Code  7(1)-1,  KRPIA  Code  7(1)-1.      
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part of the industry to place donations on more solid legal footing, by reducing the possibility 
that donations will be abused as a means for furthering illicit business purposes.    It is difficult to 
predict at this early stage how the effects of these provisions will play out and it is unclear 
whether they will bring about a sea change in companies’ behavior regarding donations.    By 
taking away from individual companies the freedom, by and large, to choose the recipients of 
their donations and by extension the freedom to choose more specifically how their funds will be 
used, these provisions run the risk of driving companies away from donations entirely.    More 
worryingly, there is also the risk that companies will seek to abuse the safety mechanisms built 
into the process, for example, by exerting influence on the Code Deliberation Committee to 
select a recipient more suited to their purposes or, work out a tacit agreement with the preferred 
recipient in advance of approaching the KPMA/KRPIA with a request for selection of a recipient, 
so that the preferred recipient can promptly come forward once the KPMA/KRPIA starts te 
solicitation process.   
 
G.  Support for Holding Academic Conferences 
The  KPMA/KRPIA  Codes  outline  a  procedure  by  which  Companies  may  provide 
financial support for third party academic conferences held in Korea.    The organizer of the 
academic  conference  must  be  an  organization  recognized  by  a  medical  doctors’  association, 
dentists’  association,  or  oriental  medical  doctors’  association,  defined  under  the  Medical 
Services  Law,  by  the  Korean  Pharmaceutical  Association  or  the  Korea  Oriental  Pharmacy 
Association, defined under the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law, or by the KPMA/KRPIA.
81   
For domestic Academic Conferences, the KPMA/KRPIA, upon receiving applications 
for  support  from  one  such  organizer,  solicits  offers  from  Companies,  based  on  which  the 
KPMA/KRPIA, through its Code Deliberation Committee, decides which Company will provide 
the requested support.
82    In this regard, the KPMA/KRPIA may permit a Company to sponsor 
                                                                    
81  KPMA  Code  8(1),  KRPIA  Code  8(1). 
82  KPMA  Code  8(2),  KRPIA  Code  8(2).      
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a domestic Academic Conference only on the condition that 20% or more of the total expenses 
incurred  be  borne  by  the  organizer.
83     For  Domestically-held  International  Academic 
Conferences, a Company that wishes to provide support for such a conference may do so by 
providing prior notice to the KPMA/KRPIA of the name of the conference and the amount and 
particulars of the support to be provided.
84  For both types of conferences, the Company that 
provided support must within one month from the conclusion of the conference submit a report, 
in a form designated by the KPMA/KRPIA, outlining the particulars of the support provided, for 
verification by the KPMA/KRPIA that support was provided in compliance with the Codes.
85  
The Company providing support must not be involved in any decision-making over the agenda, 
proceedings, participants, or related materials of the Academic Conference.
86   
The KPMA/KRPIA Codes provide for greater restrictions on companies in providing 
support  for  third  party  academic  conferences,  compared  with  the  PhRMA  Code,
87  and  also 
provide an express oversight role for the trade association that is absent in the PhRMA Code.   
The potential for abuse of the procedural requirements, similar to the one discussed with respect 
to Donations, is present here as well.               
 
H.  Support for Attendance at Academic Conferences   
Companies may provide support for individual Healthcare Professionals to attend an 
Academic Conference held in Korea or abroad, provided that the conference is held in a manner 
and at a venue appropriate to an academic or educational purpose.
88    Support is permitted only 
for Healthcare Professionals who are presenters, chairs or panelists at the conference and for 
                                                                    
83  KPMA  Code  8(3),  KRPIA  Code  8(3). 
84  KPMA  Code  Art.  8(4),  KRPIA  Code  Art.  8(4). 
85  KPMA  Code  Art.  8(2),  8(4),  KRPIA  Code  Art.  8(2),  8(4). 
86  KPMA  Code  Art.  8(5),  KRPIA  Code  Art.  8(5). 
87  PhRMA  Code  on  Interactions  with  Healthcare  Professionals  7  (2009). 
88  KPMA  Code  Art.  9(2)-1,  KRPIA  Code  Art.  9(2)-1.      
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actual expenses incurred for transportation, registration, meals, and lodging.
89    The Company 
providing  the  support  must  do  so  by  depositing  the  funds  for  the  designated  Academic 
Conference and must not directly provide support to the organizer of the Conference or the 
individual Healthcare Professionals attending that conference.
90  T he support provided must not 
be  linked  to  any  entertainment,  travel,  sightseeing,  or  leisure  activities  and  support  for  the 
companions of Healthcare Professionals is prohibited.
91    The KPMA/KRPIA must provide the 
Academic  Conference  designated  by  the  Company  with  the  deposited  funds  but  may  only 
designate  the  purpose  and  scope  of  the  support  being  provided  and  must  not  designate  the 
individual Healthcare Professionals to be supported.
92  Since the permissible support is only for 
actual expense incurred, the KPMA/KRPIA must obtain from the organizer of the conference a 
detailed statement of actual expenses incurred for transportation, registration, meals, and lodging, 
along with supporting documentation, and provide the Company with the relevant information, 
upon which the Company will deposit the appropriate amount of funds with the KPMA/KRPIA 
to be delivered to the organizer of the conference.
93   
The  Working  Guidelines  to  the  KPMA/KRPIA  Codes  provide  for  very  specific 
monetary ceilings on the support permitted.    In the case of transportation costs, for Academic 
Conferences held overseas, the ceiling is the international flight roundtrip economy class fare for 
the shortest route to destination, to be determined by the confirmed price for the date of return, 
while for Academic Conferences held in Korea, the ceiling is the domestic flight economy class 
fare, KTX (Korean bullet train) second class fare, or premium express bus fare to destination, or 
public transportation fares equivalent to the above.
94    For meals, the ceiling is three meals per 
day, KRW 50,000 per bill per meal paid for with one’s personal credit card or in cash during 
                                                                    
89  KPMA  Code  Art.  9(2)-2,  KRPIA  Code  Art.  9(2)-2. 
90  KPMA  Code  Art.  9(2)-3,  KRPIA  Code  Art.  9(2)-3. 
91  KPMA  Code  Art.  9(2)-5,  KRPIA  Code  Art.  9(2)-5. 
92  KPMA  Code  Art.  9(3)-1,  KRPIA  Code  Art.  9(3)-1. 
93  KPMA  Code  Working  Guidelines  Art.  6(4),  KRPIA  Code  Working  Guidelines  Art.  9(4). 
94  KPMA  Code  Working  Guidelines  Art.  6(5)-1,  KRPIA  Code  Working  Guidelines  Art.  9(5)-1. 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meal  time  at  a  local  restaurant.
95    For  lodging,  the  ceiling  is  KRW  200,000  per  night  for 
domestic  accommodations  and  KRW  350,000  per  night  for  overseas  accommodations,  with 
support permitted starting from the day before the conference start date to the conference end 
date.
96 
 
The basic principle of allowing financial support for healthcare professionals to attend 
academic  conferences  only  indirectly,  through  the  third  party  organizer,  and  prohibiting  the 
giving of direct support to healthcare professionals, as well as allowing support for costs of travel, 
lodging,  and  other  personal  expenses  only  for  substantive  participants  in  the  conference  are 
broadly in line with the PhRMA Code’s provisions on support for third party educational or 
professional meetings.
97    However, the KPPMA/KRPIA Codes set stringent limits on the scope 
of permissible support, in the form of very specific monetary ceilings.         
 
I.  Company-Hosted Product Informational Presentations 
When hosting Product Informational Presentations for the Healthcare Professionals of 
multiple  medical  institutions,  a  Company  may  provide  to  each  participating  Healthcare 
Professional food/beverages up to KRW 100,000 in value, reimbursement for the actual costs 
incurred for transportation and lodging, and souvenir gifts of up to KRW 50,000 in value.
98    For 
Product  Informational  Presentations  which  take  the  form  of  visits  to  individual  medical 
institutions,  a  Company  may  provide  to  each  participating  Healthcare  Professional  food  and 
beverages  up  to  KRW  100,000  in  value,  up  to  four  times  a  month,  and  small-value  brand 
reminders KRW 10,000 or less in value.
99    In the case of Product Informational Presentations at 
                                                                    
95  KPMA  Code  Working  Guidelines  Art.  6(5)-3,  KRPIA  Code  Working  Guidelines  Art.  9(5)-3. 
96  KPMA  Code  Working  Guidelines  Art.  6(5)-4,  KRPIA  Code  Working  Guidelines  Art.  9(5)-4. 
97  PhRMA  Code  on  Interactions  with  Healthcare  Professionals  7  (2009). 
98  KPMA  Code  Art.  10(1),  KPMA  Code  Working  Guidelines  Art.  7(1),  KRPIA  Code  Art.  10(1),  KRPIA 
Code  Working  Guidelines  Art.  10(1). 
99  KPMA  Code  Art.  10(41),  KPMA  Code  Working  Guidelines  Art.  7(5),  KRPIA  Code  Art.  10(4),  KRPIA 
Code  Working  Guidelines  Art.  10(5).      
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which lodging is to be provided to participating Healthcare Professionals, the Company hosting 
the event must apply to the KPMA/KRPIA for approval no later than 60 days prior to the date of 
the presentation and obtain prior approval.
100  F or all other Product Informational Presentations, 
it suffices to give notice to the KPMA/KRPIA no later than 30 days prior to the date of the 
presentation.
101  C ompanies must not hold Product Informational Presentations as a guise for 
providing food/beverages at gatherings of Healthcare Professionals.
102 
Compared  with  the  PhRMA  Code’s  provisions  on  informational  presentations  and 
accompanying meals
103  and those on speaker training meetings,
104  the KPMA/KRPIA Codes 
provide  for  a  much  more  rigid  framework  within  which  companies  may  hold  informational 
presentations for healthcare professionals and allows for oversight by the trade association.    The 
one area where the PhRMA Code seems to be more stringent is its prohibition on the giving of 
non-educational and practice-related items.
105 
 
J.  Post-Marketing Surveillance Studies   
In conducting the statutorily mandated Post-Marketing Surveillance study, a Company 
must not contract with a medical institution which is not already using the drug
106  and must not 
contract  on  the  condition  that  the  medical  institution  continue  to  purchase  or  increase  its 
purchase of the drug,
107  restrictions which are intended to deter companies from using payment 
for the studies as an inducement for the hospital or physician to start using the drug.    The 
                                                                    
100  KPMA  Code  Art.  10(2),  KRPIA  Code  Art.  10(2). 
101  KPMA  Code  Art.  10(2),  KRPIA  Code  Art.  10(2). 
102  KPMA  Code  Art.  10(5),  KRPIA  Code  Art.  10(5). 
103  PhRMA  Code  on  Interactions  with  Healthcare  Professionals  4  (2009). 
104  Id.  at  9. 
105  Id.  at  11. 
106  KPMA  Code  Art.  13(1)-2,  KRPIA  Code  Art.  13(1)-2. 
107  KPMA  Code  Art.  13(1)-3,  KRPIA  Code  Art.  13(1)-3.      
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Company must decide the number of cases for the study based on medical or pharmacological 
necessity pursuant to applicable laws and regulations and the number should be appropriate in 
light  of  the  purpose  and  content  of  the  study.
108    The  Company  may  pay  compensation  to 
Healthcare Professionals who contracted to conduct the study, at a rate of up to KRW 50,000 per 
case report, provided that up to KRW 300,000 may be paid per case report if additional survey is 
required, e.g., because the study involves a rare disease as provided under the Pharmaceuticals 
Affairs  Law  or  relevant  regulations  of  the  Korea  Food  &  Drug  Administration,  long-term 
monitoring,  or  frequent  and  significant  adverse  effects.
109    The  number  of  case  reports  for 
which the Company may provide compensation is capped at the minimum number required for 
post-marketing surveillance under applicable laws, i.e., 3,000 cases if the re-examination period 
is 6 years, and 600 cases, if 4 years.
110    The Company must not pay the full amount of the 
compensation until the study has been completed and it has been apprised of the results.
111   
 
The PhRMA Code does not have a corresponding section, particularly since the post-
marketing surveillance regulated under the KPMA/KRPIA Codes is predicated on Korea’s new 
drug approval regime.    It is notable, however, that even for this statutorily-mandated activity, 
the KPMA/KRPIA Codes set strict limits on the amount of compensation that can be provided to 
healthcare professionals, both at the individual recipient level (i.e., compensation ceiling per case 
report) and at the company expenditure level (i.e., number of cases). 
 
K.  Other Clinical Studies 
In addition to the statutorily-mandated post-marketing surveillance studies, which is a 
very narrow category by definition, a Company may undertake other clinical studies for the 
purpose  of  obtaining  medically  or  pharmaceutically  important  information  on  clinical 
                                                                    
108  KPMA  Code  Art.  13(1)-1,  KRPIA  Code  Art.  13(1)-1. 
109  KPMA  Code  Working  Guidelines  Art.  9(1),  KRPIA  Code  Working  Guidelines  Art.  13(1). 
110  KPMA  Code  Art.  13(1)-5,  KRPIA  Code  Art.  13(1)-5. 
111  KPMA  Code  Art.  13(1)-5,  KRPIA  Code  Art.  13(1)-5. 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characteristics of pharmaceuticals, diseases, or other healthcare fields of significant interest to 
the Company, pursuant to applicable provisions in the Pharmaceuticals Affairs Law and Korean 
Food and Drug Administration regulations.
112  The study must be approved by the Korean Food 
and Drug Administration or by the relevant hospital institutional review board, depending on the 
type of study.
113    The Company may provide compensation for the work done by Healthcare 
Professionals  participating  in  the  study,  but  not  direct  payment  to  the  individual  Healthcare 
Professionals is prohibited.
114    The Company must contract with and make any payment to the 
medical institution at which the Healthcare Professionals are employed.
115    As in the case of 
statutorily-mandated post-marketing surveillance studies, the Company must not pay the full 
amount of the compensation until the study has been completed and it has received a report of 
the results.
116 
 
The  PhRMA  Code  does  not  have  a  corresponding  section  on  clinical  activities  and 
PhRMA  has  chosen  instead  to  address  member  companies’  interactions  with  clinical 
investigators  and  others  as  they  relate  to  the  clinical  research  process  in  a  separate  set  of 
guidelines.
117    The  fact  that    the  KPMA/KRPIA  has  chosen  to  regulate  clinical  research 
activities  as  part  of  its  code  on  marketing  and  that  the  KFTC  has  endorsed  this  approach 
underlines  the  how  such  activities  have  been  perceived  to  date  both  inside  and  outside  the 
industry and the degree to which they have been abused for improper purposes.     
 
L.  Exhibits and Advertising 
                                                                    
112  KPMA  Code  Art.  14(1),  KRPIA  Code  Art.  14(1). 
113  KPMA  Code  Art.  14(1)-1,  KRPIA  Code  Art.  14(1)-1. 
114  KPMA  Code  Art.  14(1)-3,  KRPIA  Code  Art.  14(1)-3. 
115  KPMA  Code  Art.  14(1)-3,  KRPIA  Code  Art.  14(1)-3. 
116  KPMA  Code  Working  Guidelines  Art.  10(1),  KRPIA  Code  Working  Guidelines  Art.  14(1). 
117  PhRMA  Code  on  Interactions  with  Healthcare  Professionals  3  (2009).      
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Companies  may  put  on  exhibits  and  place  advertisements  targeted  at  Healthcare 
Professionals  in  order  to  disseminate  medical/pharmacological  knowledge  and  maximize 
benefits to patients.
118    Companies may purchase booths at academic conferences organized by 
medical institutions or academic organizations or place advertisements in publications issued or 
websites operated by such entities, provided that the payments for booths or advertisements 
accord  with  normal  commercial  practices.
119    The  Working  Guidelines  specify  what  is 
considered to be within the boundaries of “normal commercial practices”, but the KPMA and the 
KRPIA versions differ slightly in this regard with respect to payments for booths.     
The  KPMA  differentiates  between  academic  conferences  organized  by 
academic/research organizations and those organized by hospitals or other medical institutions.   
For the former, the permissible standard payment is KRW 2 million per booth, but payments up 
to KRW 3 million per booth may be allowed in light of such factors as the characteristics and 
scale  of  and  the  number  of  attendees  at  the  conference.
120    For  the  latter,  the  permissible 
standard payment is KRW 500,000 per booth, but payments up to KRW 1 million per booth may 
be allowed in light of similar factors.
121    The KRPIA likewise differentiates between these two 
categories of conferences, but with a limit of KRW 3 million per booth for academic conferences 
organized by academic/research organizations and KRW 1 million per booth for those organized 
by hospitals or other medical institutions.
122    Both the KPMA and the KRPIA limit the number 
of booths that can be purchased to one per conference and in any case prohibit the purchase of 
more than two booths.
123 
With respect to advertisements placed on websites of academic/research organizations, 
the limit is KRW 10 million per year in advertising fees, with a monthly limit of KRW 1 million.   
                                                                    
118  KPMA  Code  Art.  15(1),  KRPIA  Code  Art.  15(1). 
119  KPMA  Code  Art.  15(3),  KRPIA  Code  Art.  15(3). 
120  KPMA  Code  Working  Guidelines  Art.  11(1)-5. 
121  KPMA  Code  Working  Guidelines  Art.  11(1)-5. 
122  KRPIA  Code  Working  Guidelines  Art.  15(1)-4. 
123  KPMA  Code  Working  Guidelines  Art.  11(1)-4,  KRPIA  Code  Working  Guidelines  Art.  15(1)-4.      
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For print media, the permissible advertising fee range is from KRW 600,000 to 1.5 million for 
media published by hospitals or other medical institutions and from KRW 700,000 to 2 million 
for  those  published  by  academic/research  organizations.
124    Payment  for  advertising  is  not 
permitted for print media that has been independently produced by Healthcare Professionals or 
print  media  published  by  a  hospital and  intended  only  for  distribution  to  employees  of  that 
hospital.
125 
This is another area of activity that is not dealt with in the PhRMA Code.    Again, the 
KPMA/KRPIA Codes have taken a very rigid approach, specifying the permissible number and 
price of booths that may be purchased by companies as well as the pricing of advertising. 
 
M.  Implementation and Adherence to the Codes     
The KPMA/KRPIA Codes provide for a Code Deliberation Committee (“CDC”) to be 
constituted within the KPMA/KRPIA, comprising 10 members, 5 of whom are to be selected 
from outside the KPMA/KRPIA – 2 nominated by the Korea Consumer Agency,
126  1 by the 
National Health Insurance Corporation,
127  and 2 by the Korean Medical Association.
128  The 
quorum is 2/3 of all members in attendance and decisions are reached by agreement of the 
majority of the members present.
129   It seems that the outside members are intended to ensure 
that the interests of consumers (as consumers of drugs), the government (as payer for drugs), and 
the  medical  community  (as  prescribers  of  drugs)  are  sufficiently  reflected  in  the  CDC’s 
deliberations. 
Under the KPMA Code, the CDC is authorized to deliberate on and decide the following: 
                                                                    
124  KPMA  Code  Working  Guidelines  Art.  11(1)-3,  KRPIA  Code  Working  Guidelines  Art.  15(1)-3. 
125  KPMA  Code  Working  Guidelines  Art.  11(1)-2,  KRPIA  Code  Working  Guidelines  Art.  15(1)-2. 
126  The  country’s  primary  consumer  protection  agency. 
127  A  public  corporation  tasked  with  administering  the  country’s  National  Health  Insurance  Program. 
128  KPMA  Code  Art.  16(2),  KRPIA  Code  Art.  16(2). 
129  KPMA  Code  Art.  16(3),  KRPIA  Code  Art.  16(3).      
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(i) selection of recipients for Donations proposed by Companies, selection of donor Companies 
for  Donations  requested  by  academic/research  organizations,  determination  of  whether  the 
Donations were carried out appropriately; (ii) determination of whether support requests from 
organizers of Academic Conferences are appropriate and if so, which Companies will provide the 
support, determination of whether support was provided appropriately; (iii) investigation into 
alleged violations of the Code; (iv) matters related to the adoption of and amendments to the 
Working Guidelines to the Code; and (v) other matters related to the Code regarding which the 
KPMA  has  requested  deliberation.
130    Under  the  KRPIA  Code,  the  CDC  has  authority  to 
deliberate  on  and  decide  all  of  the  above  matters,  plus  the  authority  to  approve  Product 
Informational  Presentations  and  determine  whether  they  are  appropriate  and  to  provide  an 
authoritative interpretation in response to inquiries from member Companies regarding whether 
specific activities are in compliance with the Code.
131 
When there is an allegation of a member Company violating the Code, the CDC must 
investigate the allegation.
132  Member Companies are obligated to cooperate with the CDC’s 
investigation and against an uncooperative member Company, the CDC may impose a monetary 
penalty of up to KRW 5 million and request the KFTC for necessary action.
133   
Under the KPMA Code, when the CDC determines that a member Company has violated 
the Code, the CDC may (i) issue a warning, (ii) impose a monetary penalty of up to KRW 10 
million  (applicable  if  the  violation  is  clear  and  risks  damaging  the  reputation  of  the 
pharmaceutical industry), or (iii) impose a monetary penalty of up to KRW 100 million, file a 
complaint with the relevant authorities, and request expulsion of the member Company from the 
KPMA (applicable if the violation is clear and serious and may be subject to legal sanctions).
134  
In addition, in the event the member Company does not comply with any of the above actions, 
                                                                    
130  KPMA  Code  Art.  16(1). 
131  KRPIA  Code  Art.  16(1). 
132  KPMA  Code  Art.  17(1),  KRPIA  Code  Art.  17(1). 
133  KPMA  Code  Art.  17(2),  17(3),  KRPIA  Code  Art.  17(2),  17(3). 
134  KPMA  Code  Art.  18(1),  18(2),  18(3).      
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the CDC may request the KFTC and the Ministry of Health and Welfare for necessary action.
135   
The KRPIA Code provides for a slightly different enforcement mechanism.    When the 
CDC determines that a member Company has violated the Code, the CDC must issue a written 
decision ordering the Company to take corrective action.
136    Within 15 days from the receipt of 
the  written  decision,  the  Company  must  provide  the  CDC  with  a  written  statement  of  the 
corrective action it has already undertaken or plans to undertake.
137    If the Company does not 
comply with the corrective action, the CDC may notify the KFTC and the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare of the Company’s action violating the Code and in addition, (i) impose a monetary 
penalty of up to KRW 100 million, (ii) expel the Company from the KRPIA, or (iii) notify the 
top management of the Company’s parent.
138 
Both the KPMA and KRPIA Codes provide for a limited internal appeal process, through 
which a member Company may challenge an adverse decision undertaken by the CDC.
139    The 
KPMA/KRPIA Codes also provide for mandatory document retention for a period of 5 years for 
materials submitted by the member Companies to the KPMA/KRPIA as required by the Codes 
with respect to the activities they regulate as well as materials relating to any CDC investigation 
and disposition relating to an alleged violation.
140    The KPMA/KRPIA must respond in good 
faith with any request from the KFTC or the Ministry of Health and Welfare for production of 
documents thus retained.
141  Any amendment to the KPMA/KRPIA Code requires prior review 
and approval by the KFTC.
142 
Based on the above provisions that allow KFTC involvement in implementation and 
                                                                    
135  KPMA  Code  Art.  18(4). 
136  KRPIA  Code  Art.  18(1). 
137  KRPIA  Code  Art.  18(2). 
138  KRPIA  Code  Art.  18(3). 
139  KPMA  Code  Art.  21,  KRPIA  Code  Art.  21. 
140  KPMA  Code  Art.  20(1),  KRPIA  Code  Art.  20(1). 
141  KPMA  Code  Art.  20(2),  KRPIA  Code  Art.  20(2). 
142  KPMA  Code  Art.  23,  KRPIA  Code  Art.  23. 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enforcement  of  the  KPMA/KRPIA  Codes,  the  KFTC’s  role  as  overseer  of  the  relationship 
between  the  industry  and  healthcare  professionals  has  been  institutionalized.    Accordingly, 
seems very likely that the KFTC will continue to play a leading role in this area, at least in the 
short to medium-term, particularly since the other government agencies, now armed with their 
own  tools  of  enforcement  but  lacking  concrete  standards  to  apply  in  determining  whether 
violations  have  occurred,  can  be  expected  to  look  to  the  KPMA/KRPIA  Codes  and  KFTC 
practice as benchmarks in their efforts.        
 
V.  Conclusion 
The  KPMA  and  the  KRPIA  have  responded  to  the  drastically  changed  compliance 
environment facing the Korean pharmaceutical industry by coming up with a very complicated 
and  stringent  set  of  guidelines,  likely  in  the  hope  that  the  litany  of  new  obligations  and 
restrictions will become a mantra of good behavior for the companies, perhaps enough to restore 
the industry to good graces in the eyes of the authorities.   
Leaving aside the potentially troubling question of how much support the new Codes 
enjoy among the member companies at large, the new KPMA/KRPIA Codes reveal themselves 
to be problematic in many ways, perhaps more so if companies endeavor to follow them to the 
letter.    They will likely impose a huge administrative burden on companies in terms of time and 
money costs, since they will be obligated to meet the myriad reporting and supporting document 
submission  requirements,  as  well  as  abide  by  more  elaborate  procedures  if  they  wish  to 
undertake  any  donations  or  support  for  academic  conferences.    This  burden  may  very  well 
divert valuable human and capital resources away from and sap the corporate energy that could 
be channeled towards worthwhile pursuits such as R&D.    It is worth noting that the new Codes 
have gone into effect at a time of discernible “investigation fatigue,” as companies and people 
within  the  industry  members  feel  constantly  besieged  and  berated,  negatively  affecting  the 
morale of existing talent and hindering efforts to recruit fresh talent. 
As the Ministry of Health and Welfare emphasized, the Korean pharmaceutical industry      
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needs to root out corrupt practices and increase transparency as a whole if it is to become more 
competitive.    The KPMA/KRPIA Codes, however, appear to be putting the cart before the horse, 
defining compliance narrowly, often within arbitrary boundaries, as if keeping the price of a meal 
or a souvenir under a specific ceiling is an end in itself instead of an imperfect means to an end.     
If the KPMA/KRPIA Codes are enforced to the letter, there appears to be the danger that 
kickbacks will be driven underground, as companies stay away from promotional activities so 
strictly regulated under the Codes and rely more on cash and other illicit gifts.    This would be 
doubly negative, because the activities regulated under the Codes have very real value as tools 
for the dissemination of  information and knowledge that can benefit patients and this value 
would be lost if companies turn away from these activities.     
There is also the question of whether the KFTC is the right agency to continue leading 
government enforcement in this arena.    It is a competition authority, but competition (at least 
not  of  the  traditional  variety  on  price  or  quality  of  products)  is  not  a  hallmark  of  the 
pharmaceutical market in Korea.    This market behaves very differently in many ways from 
most  other  markets,  with  fixed  prices  (for  drugs  reimbursable  under  the  National  Health 
Insurance Program, the government sets the price) and end-consumers who are not permitted to 
choose products they consume, and payers who do not get to choose, either. 
The new KPMA/KRPIA Codes have only just become effective and may be subject to 
yet more revisions in the days to come.    So it is still too early to predict with any degree of 
accuracy how the new requirements will play out and what impact it will have on the industry in 
the  short  and  long  term.    However,  it  is  safe  to  assume  that  compliance  will  continue  to 
dominate the industry’s agenda for many years to come, as the pharmaceutical industry in Korea 
enters a brave new world. 